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Abstract—With the increasing complexity of computing sys-
tems, complete hardware reliability can no longer be guaranteed.
We need, however, to ensure overall system reliability. One of
the most important features of artificial neural networks is their
intrinsic fault-tolerance. The aim of this work is to investigate
whether such networks have features that can be applied to
wider computational systems. This paper presents an analysis, in
both the learning and operational phases, of a distributed feed-
forward neural network with decentralised event-driven time
management, which is insensitive to intermittent faults caused
by unreliable communication or faulty hardware components.
The learning rules used in the model are local in space and time,
which allows efficient scalable distributed implementation. We
investigate the overhead caused by injected faults and analyse
the sensitivity to limited failures in the computational hardware
in different areas of the network.
Index Terms—Fault-tolerance, graceful degradation, redun-
dancy, neural networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The inevitable demand for ever more computational capa-
bility drives the creation of ever larger parallel distributed
machines (e.g. the K computer has 705,024 cores [1] ), so that
although the mean time to failure (MTTF) for the individual
components can be very high (up to 106 hours [2]), the large
number of components will inevitably lead to frequent failures
– on average once every one and a half hours. Failures can
also be caused by the fact that in large multi-processor systems
the arrival of communication messages is not guaranteed
or they can arrive late [3]. This requires new solutions for
fault tolerance to allow the next generation of extreme-scale
massively parallel computers to be used at their full-capacity.
In recent years, it has been suggested that neural computing
offers a model of fault-tolerant computing. In biological brains,
neurons die without apparent loss of functionality of the whole
system and by analogy, this principle has been applied to
neural simulation engines (SpiNNaker [4], BlueBrain [5]). For
instance, SpiNNaker will employ 50,000 chips (with 20 slow –
200 MHz – processors per chip) connected over a fast network
(1 Gbps) and is based on a model of communication-centric
computation, in contrast to conventional, calculation-centric
computers with very fast processors (2 GHz) over not-so-fast
networks. In order to maintain high communication speed and
avoid deadlocks, a packet-dropping mechanism is used when
a packet cannot be forwarded [6].
Artificial neural networks have been inspired by studies
of the brain structure, where information is processed in a
parallel and distributed way. Commonly used conventional
sequential computing systems utilize one or a few sparsely-
interconnected, high performance processing units. Neural
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networks, in contrast, employ a large number of highly
interconnected, very simple processing elements, where the
computational power of the model comes above all from the
interaction of all its units.
The motivation for this work is to determine whether
neural computing can be used as a paradigm for reliable
systems running on unreliable hardware. We examine the
fault-tolerant characteristics of parallel distributed processing
networks with a feed-forward structure, in order to understand
how the required fault tolerance can be achieved on systems
with unreliable communications. The work investigates neural
network performance under damage conditions and dynamics
of weight change in a representative task.
This paper is structured as follows. We first review related
work in the field and outline several techniques to assure the
fault tolerant behavior of neural networks. Then we define the
key terms and concepts for general and comparable results
as well as discussing the network structure and training tech-
niques used in the experiments. Next we relate these findings
to an analysis of the network’s structure. The implications of
the findings for fault tolerance and its improvement are then
discussed, before concluding.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Fault tolerance in neural networks
Due to the multiplicity of individual units, neural networks
contain more processing elements than is necessary to solve a
problem. Moore [7] argued that because of the large number
of components, neural computers would need to be designed
with high quality components. In contrast, Mozer’s work [8]
has shown that units may be simply removed from a network
without damaging its performance. The loss of a few units
would be unlikely to cause any noticeable decrease in accuracy
of the overall performance in a large system. Tai in [9] showed
that losses of up to 40% can be tolerated in the Hopfield model.
This leads to the conclusion that due to the inherent
overall fault tolerance, non-critical components within the
neural network system need not be particularly reliable, as
has been proposed by Belfore and Johnson [10]. Based on
this conclusion, Chiu et al [11] proposed an algorithm to
improve both the efficiency and fault-tolerance of a multi-
layer network. In their approach a unique measure of neuron
relevance is used, according to which the least significant
neurons are eliminated, whereas the most significant ones are
duplicated.
Carter and Segee [12] empirically showed that multilayer
networks do not significantly reduce the level of tolerance after
pruning. However, they also pointed out that this is not always
the case. Despite inherent fault tolerance being provided by
the distributed processing architecture, neural networks are not
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2always tolerant of the loss of processing elements [13]. Their
conclusion is that often, instead of catastrophic failure under
the influence of faults or noise affecting inputs and internal
components, it is most likely that network performance will
degrade gracefully.
Furthermore, Segee et al showed in [14] that fault tolerance
is influenced by the training algorithm used and even the initial
state of the network. The implication is that if the number of
network processing elements can be made large, then fault
tolerance increases in the network automatically by virtue of
the gross similarity with biological neural networks. The idea
is that fault tolerance in a neural network is directly related to
the redundancy introduced because of “spare capacity”, when
the complexity of the problem is less than the computational
capacity of the network. Nijhuis et al. [15] came to a similar
conclusion, stating that fault tolerant behavior is not always
self-evident but must be assured by an appropriate training
scheme. Furthermore, [16] presents a procedure to build fault
tolerant neural networks by replicating the hidden units. An
analytical derivation of the minimum redundancy required in
order to tolerate all possible single faults is presented in [17].
On the other hand, von Seelen and Mallot [18] discuss
whether indeed a neural network’s reliability is caused by
redundancy, both in terms of fault tolerance and graceful
degradation. They assume that a neural network uses all of
its resources to balance between computational accuracy and
computation time. Thus redundancy is not identical to reserve
capacity and neural networks utilize available resources to the
full.
Taking these sometimes contradictory findings into account,
we have examined the fault tolerance of neural networks in
both the training and operational phases, so as to be able
to evaluate the system reliability when such networks are
implemented on massively parallel hardware. Moreover, the
published literature considers failures in the computational
units; we are just as concerned with failures in the communi-
cation links.
B. Concepts of Reliability
The field of reliable and fault-tolerant computation is very
wide, embracing many different architectural and operational
features of neural network systems as well as several concep-
tual viewpoints. However, in the literature an inconsistent and
often inaccurate use of key terms and concepts can be found,
which can cause confusion and uncertainty. A categorization
of the causes of failures affecting neural network reliability
must be developed in order to omit non-precise terms and
obtain general and comparable results. This section addresses
the problem and defines key terms and concepts, used further
in the paper.
First of all, to describe the reaction of the network per-
formance to faults, the terms graceful degradation and fault-
tolerance are often used. Unlike conventional computers, a
neural system is often not adversely affected by faults or noise
in internal components. Instead of failing catastrophically,
the system continues delivering acceptable, although possibly
reduced performance. Computational accuracy is allowed to
degrade in a controlled manner as the fault severity increases.
Such a low sensitivity to occurring faults instead of a complete
failure is known as graceful degradation [19].
In contrast to graceful degradation, fault tolerance is the
property that guarantees the proper operation of the system
in the event of a failure (or several failures) within some
of its components. It describes the robustness of the network
function in the presence of degradation in the computational
elements, such as broken connections or erroneously function-
ing processing elements.
A common misunderstanding is that of confusing fault
tolerance with robustness to noisy inputs. Fault tolerance is
the ability of a system to continue to perform to specifi-
cation in the presence of hardware faults, such as broken
connections, connections with an erroneous weight, or neurons
with inaccurate outputs. On the other hand, a system that
continues coping with input noise and operates correctly
despite errors in its inputs is termed a robust system. However,
it is fault-tolerance, rather than robustness, that is associated
with sensitivity to internal noise. Nijhuis in [15] refers to fault
tolerance as hardware fault-tolerance and correspondingly to
robust systems as data fault-tolerant systems. In this paper, we
focus exclusively on hardware fault-tolerance, which describes
a system’s sensitivity to faults that result in perturbations in
network parameters or topology, but does not refer to noisy or
partial input data. In fact, we believe that the sensitivity of a
system to noisy inputs is both inappropriate and inconsistent
for defining a fault-tolerant system.
Another area of potential confusion is the stage at which
errors start occurring. Carter in [13] distinguishes between
two types of fault-tolerance in neural networks: an operational
and a learning fault-tolerance. The sensitivity of network
performance to permanent or transient faults occurring at
the learning stage, is referred to as learning fault-tolerance.
Whereas the operational fault-tolerance deals with the sensi-
tivity of network performance to faults presented after learning
has been accomplished in a fault-free environment. In this
paper we pay primary attention to learning fault-tolerance.
III. FAULT SIMULATION
Neural networks are often treated as black-box systems.
Measuring the degree of failure is based on the results at
the output units for presented input data. We investigate what
level of fault-tolerance the neural network can achieve given
the faults that might occur during both learning and operation
phases. In the case of a fault occurring during the learning
phase, we consider how much longer it will take to train the
network and how fault-tolerant the final version of the network
will be. To address all of these issues, artificial faults can be
introduced into the system. This section discusses the possible
ways of introducing faults.
A. Fault-tolerance Analysis
In order to achieve a suitable analytical model of the
reliability of a neural network system, a definition of various
failure modes and their impacts on the system is required. This
would lead to a firm foundation for further investigations of the
3amount of fault tolerance exhibited by a neural network. How-
ever, taking into account the high level of inter-dependence of
elements in the system on each other, this task is extremely
complicated.
Due to the difficulty in defining the effect of an individual
unit or connection on the overall reliability of an entire system,
we use empirical investigation. We consider a type of fault that
is admittedly severe and correspond to the highest failure rates.
It is often referred as “loss of weight” fault and occur in the
case of open-circuits, [13]. Some authors refer to this fault as
“stuck-at-0”, e.g. [19]. A classical example of an open-circuit
fault can be imagined as a damaged neuron or connection,
which can be related in biological terms to the continual loss
of synapses in the brain. In simulation it is implemented by
setting the selected weight to zero.
B. Fault Injection Technique
During each simulation, faults are probabilistically intro-
duced and the degree of failure is evaluated according to some
measure. The measure of reliability from many experiments
can be plotted against the number of introduced faults injected
into the system. The plot indicates the way the neural network
model behaves depending upon the generic nature and the
faults occurrence rate. Different plots can be compared and
contrasted in order to judge the system’s sensitivity to different
types and locations of faults. This facilitates evaluation of
fault-tolerance when the type of fault and the rate of occur-
rence are known.
The fault injection technique is convenient for indicating the
isolated effects of individual faults. However it is impractical
for evaluating the impact of multiple faults as their effects
combine and are not independent. It is not realistic simply to
add the impacts of single faults in order to imitate the effect
of multiple faults due to non-predictable correlations between
them. This complicates accurate prediction of the effect of all
faults occurring together over a period of time in real use.
Also another scenario is possible: that a system maintains
an adequate performance despite a limited injection of faults.
However, after a certain fault threshold is reached, the system
may abruptly reduce its performance, which can lead to a total
failure.
Another complication is caused by the temporary nature of
many faults, often called “transient” and “intermittent” faults.
Transient faults are non-recurring and intermittent faults recur
at, usually irregular, intervals. These faults are caused by
several contributing factors, some of which may be effectively
random, which occur simultaneously. The more complex the
system or mechanism involved, the greater the likelihood of
an intermittent fault. An estimation of the impact of temporal
faults is unreliable and thus is out of the scope of this
investigation.
In conclusion, a fault injection method is useful for gaining
a very basic indication of the reliability of a neural network
system, though it may identify especially critical areas of a
neural network which can then be protected against possible
faults in any implementation.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH
In terms of fault tolerance, some neural networks and
some training algorithms are better than others. If nothing
is done to control the proper operation of the system in
the event of a fault during training, the fault tolerance of
the final network may be very random, depending on the
problem, the chosen architecture, the data representation, and
the learning examples. In this section we discuss the network
structure, training technique and teaching procedure used in
the experiment.
A. Network Structure and Connectivity
Training physically distributed neural networks with no
shared memories and decentralized event-driven time manage-
ment has always been a challenging issue. On one side, the
absence of shared memory excludes data contentions. But at
the same time there is no conscious control over the spike
generation, emitting, storing, and processing. Each processor
sequentially performs event processing in accordance with the
temporal order of these events. Nothing ensures that events
are processed in a correct order.
Of all the existing neural network topologies, the feed-
forward neural network is probably the one most often used.
This network topology consists of three or more layers: an
input layer, an output layer and a number of hidden layers
in between. Each layer contains a number of neurons, which
are connected only with the neurons of the adjacent layers.
Activity flows from input to output and the network topology
contains neither cycles nor lateral connections. The input layer
is present merely to increase the fan-out of the input data,
whereas the hidden and output layers perform computations,
as shown in Fig. 1.
Commonly, the input data is represented in a binary form,
corresponding either to the presence or absence of features.
The actual process is based on the collective computations
that are performed in the synapses and the neurons. At each
synapse the incoming signal is multiplied by the corresponding
connection strength, wij . At the neuron, these values are
summed and compared to the threshold value: if the summed
result exceeds the threshold value, a neuron emits a consecu-
tive spike, otherwise it remains inactive.
For nearly all problems, one hidden layer is sufficient.
Using two hidden layers rarely improves the model, and may
introduce a greater risk of convergence to a local minimum
and there is no theoretical reason for using more than two
hidden layers [20], [21]. Two hidden layers are, in principle,
enough to perform any classification task [22], including high-
level abstractions (e.g. in vision, language, and other AI-level
tasks) [23]. Here, the number of hidden layers is limited to
one.
In our approach, a special processor is dedicated to interact-
ing with the environment and at the same time managing the
work of other processors (e.g. network mapping, setting the
synchronization barrier). The master processor only ‘knows’
which processors are dedicated to representation of the input
and output neurons. A slave does not ‘know’ whether it
contains input, hidden or output neurons. Each slave processor
4Fig. 1. The architecture of a feed-forward neural network with n-input,
m-hidden layer and l-output node.
is idle until it receives a spike message (from another slave
or the master processor). When the spike message is received,
and the excitation conditions are met, a new spike messages
are sent to the all known targets, determined a priori while
creating the network.
B. Network Training
The dynamics of a neural network are determined by a rule,
derived by Bosman et al [24]. This is a form of reinforcement
learning, where the active weights are either incremented or
decremented by a certain weight proportion based on the
binary feedback signal in accordance with Hebbian learning.
The signal represents the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of a given
output after each attempt to associate the correct output with
a particular input. The important benefit of the model is
the locality of all the necessary information about the states
and the properties of the involved neurons for calculating
weight alterations. This allows simulation of distributed neural
networks with decentralized, asynchronous time management.
A network usually has two different operating modes:
training and operation. Identical faults are likely to have
different effects during these two distinct phases. During the
training stage, weights between the neurons are adapted in
order to learn to reproduce a set of patterns, which represents
the problem. The actual training stage of the neural network
consists of many so-called training cycles. During each train-
ing cycle the network attempts to alter its weights in such a
way that the output neurons produce an expected pattern. The
network is said to function when all training pairs of patterns
are correctly ‘memorized’.
The number of training cycles depends on various factors
such as (a) the complexity of the decision regions that is
caused by the data itself; (b) the network topology, that is
to say the number of layers and the number of neurons per
layer; (c) the learning strategy, which consists of the choice
of parameters in the training algorithm and the order of
presentation of training patterns during learning; and (d) the
rate of forgetting due to interference of the new learned data
with that previously learned.
In the case where the excitation conditions were met first
time for the current input pattern, spike messages are sent to
the post-synaptic neurons. At the same time another message
containing the value of the membrane potential is sent to
the pre-synaptic neuron from which the last spike message
arrived, indicating that pre-synaptic neuron’s spiking activity
led to the excitation of the post-synaptic neuron. The pre-
synaptic neurons store this information in the activated array.
If the excitation condition is not met for the first time for
the current input pattern, the neuron informs the pre-synaptic
neurons about the alteration of its value of membrane potential.
In the case that it receives an inhibitory signal and is not
active any more, the neuron sends another message to its post-
synaptic neurons to warp back the neurons’s influence onto
them, changing their state correspondingly.
Finally, when the output neurons produce the expected
output pattern, the master sends a message, which either rein-
forces the weights, if the received output corresponds to that
expected, or reduces (‘deinforces’) the weights otherwise. Two
arrays (activated and activatedBy ) contain all the necessary
information for applying the learning rule described in [24].
When the weights are altered, a new cycle starts.
Faults occurring during the learning stage help the network’s
resilience to possible damage in the operation stage because of
the more evenly distributed information between its weights
[25]. This prevents the situation of random information distri-
bution among the weights, when some connections are very
influential on the network output (and thus also very sensitive
to perturbations), whereas others are almost useless.
C. Forgetting
All natural cognitive systems gradually forgets previously
learned information as new information is acquired. A similar
effect is observed in artificial neural networks. While storing
a large amount of input patterns into the network, interference
of newly learned data with previously learned data occurs. It
turns out that in the distributed computational nature of neural
networks, the very virtue of the approach is at the same time
the root cause of forgetting.
The negative effect of the path interference arises when
several input patterns are applied to the neural network to
be memorized. The active paths overlap when the strongest
connection from the different input patterns point to the same
intermediary neurons. As a result, the learning of something
new causes forgetting of old data. The challenge is how to keep
the advantages of distributed computation while avoiding the
problem of catastrophic forgetting. For this it is necessary to
examine the basis of the phenomenon.
There may be several reasons for such a situation. First
of all, from the active input neuron the path of activity runs
along the strongest synaptic connections to the corresponding
output neurons. In certain situations an established path can
be completely “wiped out” by an attempt to learn new data,
so that the connection of the previously learned pattern is
5Fig. 2. An example of path interference between A-C-D and B-C-E paths.
Path A-C-D was formed at learning step tk and became the strongest one with
weight efficacy wmax, at learning step tl affects the formation of B-C-E path
with weight efficacy walt.
no longer the strongest. Also a competition between the
active path, formed in the previous steps, and the newly
forming active path can occur. Such competition often erases
or partially destroys the old path and correspondingly leads to
forgetting of old data by the network.
Corresponding to each input, the most probable signal
propagation will follow the associated pattern. However, when
the number of input patterns or the inter-connectivity level
increases, the activity paths overlap, thereby destroying each
other and corrupting the output result.
The intuitive solution is a uniform distribution of active
paths in the network. This can be achieved in two ways. Firstly,
a negative influence of active path interference can be partially
overcome by periodically shuffling the input-output pairs of
patterns before feeding them into the network, as described
in [26]. This approach assists in finding the most optimal
weight values valid for all patterns and, additionally, network’s
fault tolerance increases due to more even weight distribution
throughout the network.
D. Network Operation
During the operation stage, weights are unalterable. The
percentage of errors in recognizing the set of pre-learned
patterns (xl, dl), l = 1, ..., p will be called the global error
and is calculated in the following way.
Let wij represent the weight in the i-th row and j-th column
of the weight matrix W. The n-dimentional input pattern is
set on the input neurons, propagated through the network,
transformed according to the current state of the weights and
the corresponding m-dimensional output of the network yl is
compared with the desired one dl.
The error for the output neurons per pattern is calculated
according to the formula:
Errorl(W) =
1
m
m∑
k=1
(dlk − ylk)2. (1)
Then, the global error is defined as:
Error(W) =
√√√√1
p
p∑
l=1
Errorl(W )). (2)
So that when the actual output yl is equal to desired output
dl, the global error equals to zero.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
The distributed neural network simulator was written in the
C++ language using the Message Passing Interface library
(MPI) for inter-processor communication. The simulated neu-
ral network consisted of an input layer, one hidden layer and
an output layer. Decentralized event-driven time management
without memory sharing was applied.
A. Fault Tolerance in Training
Are all connections equally significant? To answer this
question we investigated the weight alteration dynamics during
the training process in order to identify the most and the least
significant connections. Along with the network structure, the
initial state of the weights has a large impact on the ability
to learn and the resilience of a neural network. In this section
we look into the optimal initial values of the weights.
We constructed a small network of 20 neurons (for better
visibility) and recorded the alteration of each weight, plotting
the measured values against each simulation step. We noticed
that training efficiency directly depends on the initial state of
the network: weight equilibration before the learning phase
significantly improves training process. This is demonstrated
in Fig. 3. 1000 random inputs were applied to the network
10000 times before starting any measurements. For each input
the “deinforcement” process was applied to the weights, mod-
ifying the overall distribution of their values in the network.
We paid close attention to the weights of connections
between input and hidden layers (see Fig. 4) and between
hidden and output layers (see Fig. 5), as well as to the weight
distribution at the three stages of simulation:
1) at the initial phase, which is reached after the mapping
process;
2) after the network equilibration phase, when the weight
deinforcement rule is applied to the network several
times;
3) after the learning phase, when all the pattern pairs were
successfully learned.
The Gaussian distribution of weights can be found on the
graphs at the initial phase of simulation. After equilibration is
applied, the center of the distribution slightly shifts towards the
left side for the connections between input and hidden layers
and remains almost unaltered for the connections outgoing
from the hidden layer.
A significant difference between the weight distribution
dynamics can be observed among input-hidden and hidden-
output connections after the training phase. In the first one,
6Fig. 3. Training efficiency dependence on the number of equilibration steps applied prior to training. During the training phase 4 different patterns were
learned. The network size was 2000 neurons with 5 input and 5 output neurons and 90 % connectivity.
during the training phase, distribution expands over the range
from -0.1 to 1 with a center at 0.45 and a significant con-
centration of weights around 0.5. However, the weights in the
input-hidden connections shrink considerably from being in
the range from -4 to 4 at the initial stage to the range from
-0.02 to 0.015 at the final stage with an unclear distribution
centered around -0.002.
This phenomenon can be explained in the following way.
The input neurons tend to excite only a specific set of hidden
neurons and concentrate their connection efficacy to a limited
number of neurons. Because of this, a change of the formed
active paths requires more effort but makes the connections
more stable and insensitive to changes. This behavior can be
seen in Fig. 6.
The hidden neurons broaden their influence on the wide
range of neurons, although having a comparatively low influ-
ence on them. These connections are more sensitive to the
input changes and faster adapt the required firing pattern by
exciting the right output neurons. Fig. 7 shows that weights
are almost unalterable during the initial phase of simulation,
eventually changing their weights at the final simulation phase.
The input-hidden connections adapt faster due to their lower
number and only after their weights are settled, the hidden-
output connections start actively adapting. The adaptation
process is shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, where it is clearly
visible that the hidden-output weights start adapting.
Concluding, there are two levels of learning in the three-
layer neural network. Whereas the weights of the input neurons
are less sensitive to changes, they better retain the learned pat-
terns as opposed to the weights of the hidden neurons, which
being highly-alterable and rapidly adapting, easily ‘forget’ the
learned patterns.
This allows us to assume that input-hidden connections
are more influential to the adaption of the required output
connection compared to the hidden-output connections. Taking
into account that connections with large weights are highly
sensitive (according to [25]), their faulty behaviour is more
critical for the proper operation of the network. Moreover, after
the training phase is complete, a possible fault in the input-
hidden connections is more devastating as it automatically
leads to a faulty output in the corresponding post-synaptic
nodes.
To assess the fault-tolerance of the neural network during
the training stage, the fault injection technique was applied.
Fig. 8 shows the dependence of the number of learning steps
on faults. The red line represents the dependence on the faulty
nodes and the green line represents the dependence on the
faulty synapses. The level of faults is represented in percents
rather than by the actual number of faults as this provides
a better representation of the scale of damage done to the
network.
The dependence is almost linear up until 0.3% for the
network with damaged nodes and up until 0.25% for the
network with damaged synapses. The faulty nodes reduce
the learning speed more significantly comparing to the faulty
synapses when the number of faults is small. However, this
changes to the opposite after the level of faults reaches 0.4%,
when the level of damage caused by faulty synapses becomes
larger than by the faulty nodes. The value 0.4% represent the
point when the number of faulty synapses introduced to the
7Fig. 4. Weight distribution of input-hidden connections at the initial phase
(a), after the equilibration phase (b), and after the learning phase (c).
network is equal to the number of faulty synapses caused by
the faulty nodes.
B. Fault Tolerance in Operation
We assessed the fault-tolerance of the neural network during
the operation phase. For this the fault injection technique
was applied. In order to collect statistically valid data each
simulation of the network of 2000 neurons (with 10 neurons
dedicated to input and another 10 neurons to output, taught
20 pairs of patterns) was run 1000 times. Each time a certain
number of faulty nodes was placed probabilistically according
to the described fault injection technique and quality of the
network output was measured by Eq. 2. The quality of output
represents the global error and stands for the probability of
receiving the expected output and is based on the maximum
number of different bits between the expected patterns and
the produced pattern. This experiment produced a plot of the
neural network fault tolerance against the number of faulty
nodes and synapses, by which the network reliability could
then be judged.
Fig. 9 shows the effect of faults injection while evaluating
a set of 20 patterns. We presented the damage volume in
percentage to the all possible damages in order to scale the
amount of damage with the size of the physical implemen-
tation. The figure shows that performance degradation is in
some sense graceful. According to the plot, 5% faulty nodes
guarantees 60% correct output and 10% faulty nodes reduces
the probability of the correct result to 50%. A network with
2% faulty nodes produces the correct result with a probability
of 90%. Fig. 10 presents the zoomed area of Fig. 9.
Any fault will influence the output to some degree since
all components participate in any computation. This leads to
graceful degradation being exhibited by most neural networks,
i.e. neural networks will not suffer catastrophic failure, and
also allows approaching failure to be detected by using a
continuous reliability measure. The fault tolerance that results
in this reliability is not inherent within neural networks: it does
Fig. 5. Weight distribution of hidden-output connections at the initial phase
(a), after the equilibration phase (b), and after the learning phase (c).
Fig. 6. Weight alteration of connections between input and hidden layers
during the simulation progress (rotated for the best visibility).
Fig. 7. Weight alteration of connections between hidden and output layers
during the simulation progress (rotated for the best visibility).
8Fig. 8. Dependence of the number of learning steps required to learn 20
neurons by 500-neuron size network on the faults number injected at the
network level during the learning process. The level of faults is presented in
percents.
Fig. 9. The quality of output against the amount of faulty neural network’s
nodes while recalling pre-learned 20 patterns using the network of 2000
neurons.
Fig. 10. The quality of output against the amount of faulty neural network’s
nodes while recalling pre-learned 20 patterns using the network of 2000
neurons (zoomed version of Fig. 9).
need to be specifically designed and built into them, and so the
architectural complexity which often arises due to various fault
tolerance techniques being used is absent in neural network
systems. Finally, although any faults which do occur cannot
be located, they can be removed from the system since neural
networks can learn.
Although the experiments were performed on comparatively
small networks (about 2000 neurons) with a small training set,
the results are considered indicative for large networks with
large training sets due to the scalable nature of calculations.
We conclude that fault tolerance arises because the compu-
tation is distributed in the neural network rather than localized.
Moreover, the system is self-organizing rather than being
centrally configured.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Faults do and will occur in a system over time, and
there always will come a time when performance is below
acceptable limits. The issue of fault tolerance is of particular
importance for the creation of large distributed machines
based on communication-centric computation. However unlike
traditional computing techniques, the neural network approach
does not insist on exact computation. There is the strongly non-
linear nature and the distribution of information or “knowl-
edge” throughout all of the network.
We presented a distributed feed-forward neural network,
which is insensitive to intermittent faults caused by unreliable
communication or faulty hardware components. A review of
work examining the fault tolerance of neural networks has
been presented along with several techniques assuring fault-
tolerant behavior. Also, various possible influences on the fault
tolerance of neural networks were discussed. Among them,
we show that uniform weight distribution offers the particular
promise of more effective and faster training. We also show
that reducing the connectivity between input and hidden layers
is more advantageous prior to learning and the connections
between hidden and output layers are less vulnerable to faults
during learning and afterwards.
Almost all of the units and connections participate in
producing an output either directly or indirectly. Since it is
difficult to exactly determine the required amount of process-
ing units and their connections, their redundant number results
in a higher degree of reliability. Thus the malfunctioning of
a particular element of a system should not greatly affect the
system’s function if there is sufficient redundancy.
This analysis offers several more general lessons for build-
ing reliable systems on unreliable hardware. Clearly some
redundancy is needed, and homogeneity is important, but self-
organisation is also a necessary requirement.
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